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Recce: Small team missions behind enemy lines is an autobiography by 
Colonel (retired) Koos Stadler. The book mainly covers his career as a Special 
Forces officer and reconnaissance soldier during South Africa’s so-called Border 
War in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) and Angola, and his involvement in 
operations against the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and its 
military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). It also covers 
operations against the African National Congress (ANC) and Angolan forces. 
Stadler, a highly decorated Special Forces operator of the former South 
African Defence Force (SADF)a and the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF),b served in several command and staff positions in the Reconnaissance 
Commandosc  in a career that culminated with a tour of duty as South African 
military attaché in Saudi Arabia. His career in tactical reconnaissance began with 31 
Battalion, the former Bushmend Battalion of the SADF, located at Omega Base in 
Namibia’s Caprivi, from November 1978 to December 1981. He subsequently 
served in the Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces) where he specialised in unique 
small team missions and strategic reconnaissance from 1984 to 1989. The book 
focuses primarily on the latter period, but his 
service in 31 Battalion provides a valuable 
run-up and understanding of the theme of the 
book. Stadler’s aim with the book was to 
describe his experiences as a small team 
                                                          
a The pre-1994 South African military. 
b The post-1994 South African military 
c South African Special Forces. Also known as the Recces, thus the title of the book. 
d Also known as the San people. 
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operator, in order to shed light on the employment of small teams as a strategic 
reconnaissance concept and capability of special forces. 
The book is written in a narrative and descriptive format and it is a personal, 
though authoritative account. The use of personal notes, recollections of former 
colleagues and the use of official documentation are mentioned, without any 
specifics or source references. The author follows a chronological approach in the 
book by describing a capita selecta of Small Team and other Special Forces 
operations. Each operation contains background on the strategic and operational 
context, how the operation was executed, as well as the outcome, with some 
conclusions. The book is written predominantly on the level of tactics, techniques 
and procedures (TTPs). In the author’s note, he provides an outline of the aim of the 
book, its scope, his own military career and how he became involved in small team 
reconnaissance operations.  
The book is organised into four parts. In the first part, the reader is 
introduced to the nature of small team reconnaissance work, with a striking extract 
of a specific high-risk operation that is described in more detail later in the book. 
This sets the scene for the book. The author provides a background of his childhood 
days, the beginning of the Bush War and his early military career. Reference is 
made to key people, adventures, events, exposure, and experiences that prepared 
and shaped the author for special forces work. The second part of the book deals 
with the author’s training and service at 31 Battalion. As the SADF’s Bushmen 
Battalion, it conducted counterinsurgency operations extending to 60 kilometres 
into Angola or Zambia. The author’s tactical reconnaissance work as part of combat 
patrols and in locating SWAPO and Angolan military bases since February 1979, 
are discussed with specific reference to key lessons that were learned about the art 
of reconnaissance and counterinsurgency. The author noted, for example, that 
success with counterinsurgency (and reconnaissance work) is relative and that at 
times, withdrawal from a risky situation may be more prudent than becoming 
involved in an unnecessary firefight, and possibly compromising a future attempt on 
the same target.1 The author’s involvement in several semi-conventional operations 
of the SADF in Angola, such as Operation Saffraan (March 1979), Operation Protea 
(August 1981), and Operation Daisy (November 1981) are highlighted. The 
refinement of the composition and functioning of tactical reconnaissance teams, for 
different types of operations, forms an important component of this part of the book. 
This discussion concludes with the ending of the author’s short-term service in the 
SADF and his commencement with theological studies at Stellenbosch University. 
In the third part of the book, the author explains his realisation that 
theological studies were not his life-passion and his consequent decision to pursue 
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his dream to become a Special Forces operator. The pre-selection period, the 
gruelling Special Forces selection and training and his qualification as Special 
Forces operator are briefly discussed. The author describes his initial deployments 
in Special Forces, which delayed his dream to serve in the small teams. This 
included a short stint with 53 Commando of 5 Special Forces Regiment – for 
counterinsurgency work at Nkongo in Ovamboland, in August 1984, followed by a 
trying period of pseudo-guerrilla operations (with former SWAPO soldiers) as part 
of 51 Commando. The author concludes this discussion with reference to the 
establishment of the Small Team capability as a sub-unit of 5 Special Forces 
Regiment. 
The last and most comprehensive component of the book commences with 
the author’s eventual transfer to the Small Teams sub-unit at Special Forces and 
ensuing specialised exercises and skills training for deployment, including language 
training in Portuguese and specialised communications techniques. The key 
personalities in the Small Teams community are introduced with reference to their 
experience, as well as their unique working relationships with the author. The 
narrative about Operation Cerberus (September 1985), during which Angolan heavy 
transport aircraft had to be targeted, depicts the resourcefulness of UNITA forces 
(‘Union for the Total Independence of Angola’) and the ability of Special Forces 
soldiers to inflict significant damage behind enemy lines. This operation, like many 
others in the book, serves as an example that Special Forces operations require 
significant time, thoroughness and patience to plan, rehearse and execute. Another 
operation, Operation Killarney (December 1985 to January 1986) during which the 
railway line between Namibe and Lubango (near Caraculo) in Angola was targeted 
with demolitions to disrupt the Angolan and SWAPO supply lines, is also discussed. 
This operation depicts how dedicated scientific expertise and support can provide 
the required effects for military operations, as well as the practical and unique 
solutions that special forces often have to develop to ensure success. The discussion 
also includes an outline of operations against African National Congress (ANC) 
targets. Operation Caudad (May 1986) in Harare (Zimbabwe) was one of several 
simultaneous operations against ANC structures in Gaborone (Botswana) and 
Lusaka (Zambia). In Harare, an ANC house and offices were targeted. Later in the 
book, another operation against the ANC in Tanzania, Operation Angel (August 
1987) is described as a failed attempt to attack the ANC top structure. This 
operation highlights some challenges with interagency cooperation during covert 
operations. Operation Colosseum (October to November 1986), an attack on 
SWAPO’s Eastern Front headquarters, portrays the tension between sufficient time 
required for proper perimeter reconnaissance of a base or target, and limited time 
available to execute a deliberate attack. The operation highlights the pressures that 
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operational security concerns can place on the available time to execute an 
operation. Operation Abduct 1 (January to February 1987) at Menongue and 
Operation Abduct 2 (November to December 1987) at Lubango, were aimed at 
destroying Angolan fighter aircraft on the ground with demolitions. These 
operations are probably the most prominent ones addressed in the book, given the 
high level of risk involved. Only Small Teams were able to execute such operations. 
The author describes how he had to get professional psychological help to manage 
his fear between the execution of the latter two operations. 
In the epilogue, the increasing demand for Small Teams during Operations 
Modular, Hooper and Packer, the SADF’s conventional support for UNITA in the 
Angolan Civil War in the late 1980s are highlighted. The author describes what 
happened to his close colleagues in the Small Team community after Operation 
Abduct 2 and how he ended up in the tactical headquarters of the final Small Team 
operation of the Bush War. The book concludes with a brief outline of subsequent 
achievements and milestones in his career and personal life, including his 200-km 
hike in the Empty Quarter of the Arabian Peninsula. 
The main arguments and lessons learnt 
The author makes two main arguments in terms of reconnaissance work and 
small teams. Firstly, he emphasises the importance of small tactical reconnaissance 
teams (often trained by special forces) for locating opponents and their bases behind 
enemy lines and guiding assault forces to a target for deliberate attacks or raids, as 
performed by 31 Battalion (and 32 Battalione).2 During the Bush War, this enabled 
Special Forces to focus their attention on strategic level tasks. Secondly, Small 
Teams for strategic reconnaissance missions are a critical Special Forces capability 
for strategic level tasks, especially strategic reconnaissance, and small teams have to 
be employed correctly and with due consideration of past lessons learnt. This is the 
main focus and intrinsic argument in the book. 
From the experiences in various operations, Stadler mentions several lessons 
learnt that shaped the way that Small Teams refined their way of conducting 
operations. 
                                                          
e 32 Battalion was an SADF unit which operated in both Namibia and Angola during 
the Bush War. It specialised in counterinsurgency and later took part in 
semi-conventional operations in Angola. It was led by SADF officers and 
consisted largely of former Angolans that initially fought for the FNLA 
(Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola) against the MPLA (Movimento 
Popular de Libertação de Angola), during the Angolan Civil War. 
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Firstly, standard military practice, doctrine and textbooks do not necessarily 
always provide solutions against an adaptable opponent and new ways of operating 
must be conceptualised, tried and tested, even to a point of pushing the boundaries 
of standing military orders 3 Stadler points out, for example, that the initial 
conventional practice of sending no less than a ten-man section on reconnaissance, 
did not work. Thus, the rules had to be adapted for operational requirements to 
experiment with smaller teams that were less detectable, before the success and 
importance of small reconnaissance teams were realised by higher headquarters. 
Secondly, Small Team operations had to be overseen and controlled by their own 
tactical headquarters and dedicated signals component given their unique signal 
requirements to avoid critical messages from Small Teams getting lost in high 
volumes of radio messages from other, larger groupings.4 The inherent argument 
being that if one radio message from a Small Team was missed, it could have had 
dire consequences. Thirdly, detailed preparation was required in terms of studying 
the situation, planning with all relevant role players, preparing contingencies, doing 
rehearsals and preparing equipment.5 The reality with Small Team operations is 
such that any small error or lack of planning can result in mission failure, or even 
worse – capture or death.6 
Fourthly, the presence and modus operandi of Small Teams’ should not be 
wasted on targets with little value. 7  The argument was that opponents were 
responsive and a successful method could not be repeated. Operators, therefore, had 
to know when to withdraw if the initiative was lost, when to attack a target and 
when not, and when to run. This presupposed that operators had to have a clear 
understanding of the tactical, operational and strategic consequences of their 
decisions and actions. This makes the ‘labelling’ of Small Teams by their executive 
officer at the time, Commandant Boet Swart8 as “Small teams, big packs, small 
brains”9 quite comical for its irony. 
An overall conclusion deduced from the book is that Special Forces may 
inflict significant strategic damage, but it may also be very difficult against a skilful 
opponent and there were no guarantees about the outcome or consequences of an 
operation.  
Evaluation of the book 
The book has many strong points. The author maintains his focus on the aim 
of the book very well and must be credited for not getting side-tracked. 
Furthermore, the book makes a contribution in terms of Afrikaans and English 
literature, especially for the way in which operations are described with comical 
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real-life stories. The detailed, yet concise descriptions, quality of language and style 
of writing, as well as the avoidance of unnecessary military jargon and bureaucratic-
type writing, make this a valuable piece of literature. 
The author’s willingness, to describe some of his deepest feelings and 
personal struggles, while serving as an operator, adds an unusual quality to a book 
of this nature, which leaves the reader with much food for thought about real-life 
issues and questions. The author honestly admits and describes several mistakes and 
poor judgement calls that he made during operations and in working relationships. 
He also describes the fears with which he struggled throughout his reconnaissance 
career and especially as a Small Team operator and how he very wisely sought 
professional help from a psychologist to assist him manage his fear – something 
many soldiers unfortunately were reticent to do. Admitting these feelings, struggles 
and mistakes shows a high level of emotional intelligence and maturity and provides 
valuable lessons for the military profession.  
The maps, illustrations and photographs complement the book. They enable 
the reader to develop a better understanding of the distances, the nature of the 
terrain and conditions, as well as the personalities involved. 
Autobiographical works are by nature about the person and will always 
contain some elements of pride. This book is no exception. However, the author is 
clearly modest and self-critical in many ways. His confidence and pride in the 
capabilities of the South African Reconnaissance Commandos is in itself a 
reflection of the South African Special Forces of the time. One would expect 
nothing less from a person who received the Honoris Crux medal for bravery. 
There are a few shortcomings to the book and the ones mentioned here are 
relative and open for debate. Firstly, at times, the author provides a too vague 
synopsis of the real nature of selection, training and working in Special Forces, or 
the relationship of the latter with the rest of the SADF or the South West Africa 
Territorial Force. For example, neither the practical difficulties of life in a Small 
Team observation post, nor the aftermath of combat receive much attention. The 
book is, therefore, generally inclined towards omitting certain unpleasant or 
sensitive details. Secondly, the author’s work as a Small Team operator ends in 
1989, with very little further detail on the Small Team capability. Was this 
capability, for example, not utilised during the critical period of transition inside 
South Africa during the early 1990s? Thirdly, although the aim of the book is 
focused on providing a narrative, it lacks some argumentative conclusion, especially 
in the end. 
Several questions can be asked regarding Small Teams and their utilisation, 
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given the matters raised in this book. How can the misuse of Small Teams be 
avoided? How should the tactical command and control of Small Teams slot in with 
joint operations? 
Relevance and value 
One might ask, what is the present-day value of an autobiography by a 
South African Special Forces operator from the era of the Bush War? The author 
makes several important, but brief arguments about counterinsurgency against 
SWAPO, that are still applicable to curbing insurgency elsewhere in Africa. Firstly, 
insurgents in the African bush cannot be beaten with sheer firepower or numbers, 
but only through outsmarting them and competing with them on their own terrain 
through operations based upon sound and tested intelligence.10 Secondly, guerrilla 
warfare must be used against insurgents, not only to be successful with 
counterinsurgency, but also for Small Teams (or other entities) to survive.11 
This book provides a valuable addition to the existing, but relatively limited 
body of knowledge on the role of Special Forces in South Africa and elsewhere, 
especially on strategic reconnaissance by small team operators. It provides essential 
reading for SANDF members, as well as aspiring ones, since it addresses key 
aspects of soldiering in Africa, including the importance of knowing the natural 
environment and bushcraft – aspects that are easily neglected in the Information 
Age. Future research on this theme could focus on the role of Small Teams during 
the sensitive transitional period from 1990, the new democratic dispensation and 
most importantly – in Africa over the last two decades.   
Evert Jordaan, Military Strategy Department, Stellenbosch University 
Endnotes 
                                                          
1 Stadler, K. Recce: Kleinspan-operasies agter vyandelike linies. Cape Town: 
Tafelberg, 2015, 58. 
2 Ibid., p. 43. 
3 Ibid., p. 114. 
4 Ibid., p. 271. 
5 Ibid., p. 269. 
6 Ibid., p. 96. 
7 Ibid., pp. 304–305. 
8 According to Stadler, Commandant Boet Swart (then Second-in-Command of 5 
Special Forces Regiment) made this joking remark about small teams for 
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choosing to return to their difficult work in the bush over a possible 
comfortable life and job in a base. 
9 Stadler op. cit., p. 330. 
10 Ibid., p. 140. 
11 Ibid., p. 59. 
